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It would be hard to identify a
larger loss to insurance consulners
in Montana than that dealt the public the day the 1997 Iægislature
passed the "anti-stacking"

codified

as

billl now

MC,\ $33-23-203 and

known as the "anti-stacking statute." W'hen that law took effect,
families with four cars suddenly had
one-quarter of the automobile'UM,

UIM, and Med Pay coverages they
had before the effective date but
still paid the same premiums.
Before the 1,997 stahrte, consurners in Montana could stack their
auto insurance when they paid premiums for coverage on more than
one car. The Supreme Court had
been doing so since 1972 when it
stacked UM coverages from dlfferent carriers tn SullÍuan v. Doe.2 In

I(emp

v.

Allstate fns. Co.r3'rr,t

1979,the court established that you
could stack multiple UM coverages

y PRo¡'rssoR Gaac Mulvao

under separate policies with the

silrìe company, and in Chaffee v.
U.S. Fid, & Guar. Co.,a held you
could stack coverage for multiple
cars under the same policy.

When the insurance industry
secured passage of the Frrst "antistacking" bills in 1981, it only blocked
stacking where multiple vehicles
were insured under the same policy.
The 1981 stâtute was later held, in

Farmers AIIíance Mut. fns. Co. v.
Ifolemanrí to apply only to compulsory coverages of Bodily Injury
Liability and Uninsured Motorist.
The statute did not block stacking
of Medical Pzy covetage and Underinsured Motoris t coverage.
It is important to note the different choices auto insurers made
when covering multiple vehicles in
Montana in the years after the 1981
stâtute took effect. State Farm
placed an insured's multiple vehicles

under separate policies and collected
separate premiums, while Farmers
Insurancõ Company placed ù insured's multiple vehicles under the
same policy collecting separate premiums. On the other hand, USF&G
and Allstate placed multiple vehicles
under the same policy but reportedly charged a single premium for
UM coverage. USF&G and Allstate
heeded the court's oft repeated reasoning that if the insurer chatged
multiple premiums, the insured
would be entitled to multiple coverages. On the other end of the marketing spectrum, State Farm contjnued to charge multiple premiums
and never sought the benefit ofthe
1981 anti-stacking statute, since it
placed each vehicle under a separate
polic¡ a practice to which the starute did not apply.T
It was in the context of this
roughly two-decade stacking history
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Gotoskí v. IfÍglúands Ini;.
Gtoup and Notthwestem ltlatíonal Cas ualty Company,
(Settled) MTLÂ Member Gary
Zzdick,Seventh Judicial Dis trict,
Wibaux County, Cause No. DV-10.
Lawrence Goroski was killed
while a passenger in a single-car accident. Goroski had eight separate
vehicles covered under a single policy for which he paid eight separate
premiums fot UIM and Med Pay
coverage. Gary Zadick sued to
stack the coverages. Subsequently,
Gary drafted and showed to the
carcíer an excellent brief on motion
for summary judgment after which
the case settled without filing the
bdef. Again, I have cited extensively from his brief but urge members to read the entire brief, posted
on the MTLA website, along with
the other fine stacking brieß posted
there for the members' benefit.

Ilady v. Ptogressíve Specialty Ins. Co., (Summary iudgment decision pending) MTLÂ
member Kent Duckworth. Federal
District Court, Missoula Division
fMolloy], Cause No. CV-01-130-MDWM.
Progressive charged the severely injured insured three separate premiums for 50,000 UIM limits for each of three separate vehicles insured under the same policy.
When the company refused to stack
the UIM coverages, Kent fltled suit
and moved for summary iudgment.

FìIban v. USAA Casualty
Ins. Co. (Summary judgment decision pending) MTLA member
Cathy Lewis. ErghthJudicial District, Cascade County, No. ADV
01-83ó. fMcKittrick]

Filban and Scoggins \¡r'ere
killed in a head-on collision with
Maki, who was headed the wrong
way on I-15 at Hardy, Montana.
Filban had three vehicles under one
USA,A. policy with three separate
premiums for UIM and for Med
Pzy coverage, which also included
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seatbelt/airbag and death benefits.
Iæwis sued the carriet and briefed
cross-motlons for summary judgment.

Mitchell v. State Farm fns.
Co., (Decision pending) ¡lTL,\
member Steve Fletcher, Montariâ
Supreme Court No. 02-052.
Chades Mitchell was severely
injured as a passenger in a single car
accident in Montana onJanuary 27,
1998. He covered five vehicles under separate State Farm policies issued in Califomia and paid separate
premiums for UM and UIM coverage. The Fourth Judicial

District

court in Missoula County applied
Califomia law in spite of the l{emp
v. Allstate fns. Co.8 and Youngblood v. American Starcs fns,
Co.e decisions and upheld the carrier's defìnition of UIM to find no
coverage. Cahfomiahas an antistacking stâhrte and a statutory definition of UIM that defeats the coverage entirely n marry cases. The
case is on appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court and under review by
the Âmicus Committee of MTLA.
O ther case s: DougMarshall
told me some time ago that he was
briefrrg a case filed in the Butte Division of the Montana Federal District Court. He was planningattacks
on the statute for separation of

powers, impairment of conuactual
oblþtions, denial of equal protec-

tion and substantive due process.
Mick McKeon reported havtngz
s

tacking case against Progressive,

Dan Bidegaray indicated last April
that he and Mike Cok were pressing
to stack Med Pay limits in a State
Farm case. He said Mike George
was also pressing a stacking case at
that time. Larry Grubbs reported he
was filing suit in a case seeking to
stack GEICO policy UM and Med
Pay limits. He said his partner, Mike
Eiselein, was also handling a stack-

ing case. Dale McGarvey indicated
many months ago that he had six
cases involving stacking and was

fast tracking one case in particular. I
believe Alan læmer has one or more
cases going and, inJuly, Roland Durocher reported he was pursuing a
case involving stacking of UM and
Med Pay coverage on four State
Farm policies. Richard Rarnler argued a stacking case before Judge

Guenther in Gallatin County in December. He said he incoqporated
substantial portions ofJoe Bottomly's brief. Finally,Gary Rice reported working on a stacking case
involving Farmers Insurance Company. I do not know the present
status of these cases but report them
for nenvorking putposes.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR
STACKING
Cathy læwis, in her brief in the

Fílban

case, provides a thorough
history of stacking coverages in
Montana, especially noting that the
Montana courts hzve an unbroken
chain of public policy statements in

rcgard to assuring coverage for
which the insured pud a separate
premium. This historical context is
important for the arguments that
follow.

Argument The carrier failed to
"clearþ inform or noti$ the insured in writing of the limits of
the coverage with respect to the
premium charged" as required in
MCA S 33-23-203 (3).
Gary Zadick,in Goroski, asserts that before the 1997 antistacking statute, Montana cases
made clear that stacking of portable
coverages, UM, UIM, and MedPa¡
was the "benefit of the bargain" for
auto insurance consurners. Insrlrers
knew that anti-stacking language in

"limits of liability" clauses in their
policies was invalid by reason of
public policy in the state. Because
the statute changed the benefits, the
legislature recognized the importance of notice to the insureds. Accordingly, subsection (3) of the 1997
anti-stacking statute required the insurers to 'hotifi the insured in writ-
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ing of the limits of the coverage
with respect to the premium
charged."

Zadick rn Gorc skÍ argaed:
'Defendant insurer failed to give
notice to the insured that for the
same premium charged on each of
eight vehicles, the insurer was only
going to extend one singfe underinsured limit and one single medical
expense limit. The failute to give
the notice is contrary to the abovequoted statute and invalidates the
attempted renewal on less favonble
tems." Zzdick argues this was critical in light of the previous public
policy statements ìn Bennett u.
State Fatm Mut. Auto. fns. Co.rlo

Ruckdashchel v. State Fatm
Mut. Auto. fns. Co.rtt Farmerc
AIIíance Mutual v. Ifolemant2
and Grier v. Nationwide Mut.
fns. Co.r3 that separate benefits be

be $0.00 for each additional policy
where the carrier intends to block
stacking of coverage. Instead, the
declarations pages lead the consumer to believe full limits o[each
coverage are avulable for each pre-

mium. As Bottomly's brief says, if
"the premiums Charles paid for UM
and UIM coverage entitled him to
nothing [for the additional coverages], then he should have been so
informed. He was not." Additionally, the brief points outÍhat Bennett v. State Fanfls held that the
insuter's basic insuring agreement

"unambiguously provides an insured a reasonable expectation to
recover damages up to the limit of

both policies under which she was
an insuted and for which separate
premiums had been paid."

provided when separate premiums
are charged. Lewis similady argued

Argumenü A policy provision
blocking sacking of UM coverage is void as a violation of MCA

that those cases gave rise to the

s 33-23-201.

customer's "reasonable expectation" that the coverage could be
stacked increasing the need for notice.

Zadickalso bases his notice
argument on MCA S 33-15-1106,
which requires insurers to give 30day notice before a policy teffn expires of any change by which the
policy will be renewed "on less favorable terms." That the coverages
could not now be stacked was
cleady a less favorable term in Oc-

ln Thomas v. lt{otthwestem Nad. fns.
tober of L997.The covrt

Co.t+ rndicated that insurance consrüners expect the same coverage
upon renewal unless they are given
conspicuous notification of change.
Furthermore, the court,
Thomasrheld that insurance consumers were not obligated to read the
renewal policy. Failure to grve appropriate notice estopps the carrier
from denying the benefits.

n

Joe Bottornly similady argues

that the canier must give notice
that the limits of coverage with respect to the premium charged will
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Bottornly,'tn Cameton argues

if the carcier is blocking stacking of UM coverage by using afamthat,

ily exclusion, then that exclusion
violates the UM statute MCA S 3323-207. The Montana Supremè
Court treats UM coverage as a compulsory coverage required by statute,16 so that it cannot be diminished below the statutory minimum
by a policy provision.

Argumenü The carrier failed to
inform the insured "whether the
coverage from one policy or motor vehicle may be added to the
coverege of another policy or

motor vehicle" as required in
MCA S 33-23-203 (3).
Bottomly, ln Cameton, drssects the notice sent by State Farm

to show that it really doesn't give
the statutory notice required but instead, refers back to the policy language which is in fact an exclusion
(family), not ari anti-stacking provision. Jarussi, tn lfancock, argues
that the purported notice given by

Farmer's Alliance Mutual that cov-

UIM, and Med Pay
could not be stacked could be read
by the consurner to meari that he
could not add his UM, UIM, and
Med Pay coverage under the same
policy. He cites additional conflicting intelpretations and concludes
that the notice is deficient under the
erages for UM,

statute.

Argumenü A policy provision restricting coverage to only one
limit where multiple premiums
have been paid is not a
"reasonable limitation" authorized by the statute.
This argument was advanced
by Gene Jarussi tn Ifancock.He
contended that UM and UIM coverages, being portable like life insuraflce,are personal and follow the
insured regardless of whether he is a
pedestrian, passenger, or driver at
the time of the accident. To allow
the insured to buy multiple coverzges,p^y multiple premiums and
then, by "limitation of liability" provision, restrict him to one limit is
not a "reâsonable limit" as allowed
by the statute.
Judge Cybulski so ruled in
.Farmets Allíance Mutual v. Ifancockl1 on September 8,2000. Gary

Zadickand Cathy Iæwis also argue
this point in their briefs relying on
Cybulski's decision. Kent

Duckworth makes the same argument in ll^tdy v. Ptogressive.

ArgumenÍ The insurer simpþ
g ve nonotice
This is ari argument fact specific to each case. Laura Christofferson, briefìng on behalf of the insuted, Daniel Olson, tnthe Ifancockcase argued, after review of the
facts, that the insurer simply gave no
notice. With regard to the insurer's
puqported notice, she said:
This notice is not directed to

Mr. Olson specifically, does
not state what the limits of
the covetage are or were with
regard to his vehicles, what
the premium is nor does it
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cleady define what effect this
change may have upon Mr.

Olson. There is no indication
when the notice was sent or
that lv{r. Olson even received
or whether it was actually
sent to him.
Christofferson noted that
shortly after the enactment of the
statute there were policy renewals to
which the statute applied with no
notice given the insured so he could
increase his limits for his protection
if he chose.

Argument A policy contract that
requires multiple premiums for
multiple coverages but restricts
the benefit to a single limit is unconscionable.
Zadickasserts that the Court
tn

Leibnnd

Union Prcp.

l{ational Fatmerc
& Cas.18 indicated

v.

that the unconscionability doctrine
of the Uniform Commercial Code
can be applied to insurance policy
contracts. He says the two-fold test

for unconscionability is (1) contractual terms unreasonably fzvonble
to the drafter and Q) no meanngfirl
choice on the part of the other

paty regarding acceptance of the
provi sion. Zadick contends that
policies providrng for multiple premiums and restricting benefits to a
single limit meet this test. Note that
this argument avoids getting tangled
in or challenging the statute.
Similady,læwis cites the 9ù
Circuit's decision upholding Judge
Molloy's frnding of unconscionability n Ticlnor v. Choice lfotels,
fn(I, fnc.ro for the proposiúon
that, in Montana, it requires "a ftnding that the contract: 1) was one of
adhesion; 2) was not within rhe
weaker pary's teasonable expectations, or 3) if within its expectations, it was unduly opptessive, unconscionable or against public policy." She builds her argument on
insurance standardized forms, takeit-or-leave-it offers, unequal bargaimng position, and the insured's
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reasonable expectations to argue
that anti-stacking contracts are unconscionable if the insurer collects

multrple ptemiums.

Argumenfi Policies providing
multiple coverages for separate
premiums but restricting benefits
to a single limit should be reformed by the court in equity.
Zadick,in Gotoski, notes that
MC,{ S 28-2-1.677 gives a court the
power to reform 2'cofitract "due to
mutual mistake, unilateral mistake,
or fraud." FIe notes that the insurers
continued to charge multiple premiums when they had "presumably
made a corporate decision to no
longer stack benefits." The multiple
premiums paid were consideration
for an agregate limit, and a similar
premium had been charged in ptevious years for limits that could be
stacked. It is unlikely that the insured wanted or expected a reduction to a fuac¡ton of his former coverage for the same premium. Zzdtck
argues that these facts at most establish fraud and, at least, establish
unilateral mistake. Hence, he submits that the contract should be reformed to provide a single premium
and a single a gregate limit of liability. One caflargüe that this approach does not seek to stack but
only to reform the contract, so that
it is not in derogatron of the antistacking statute.

Argument The policy doesn't
really prohibit sacking and,
therefore, falls under the
ttprovides otherwisett exception
to the anti-stacking statute.
læwis, n rhe Filban case, ztgr"res

russi atgues ìn

lfancockthat Farm-

ers Alliance Mutual's limit ofliability
clause doesn't actually preclude
stacking of UIM coverage so that it

falls in the exception created by the
statute. In several ofthe cases filed,
counsel have carefully studied the
offending provisions to see if they
are ambiguous, don't appl¡ or don't
on their face do what the insurer
thinks they do. The arguments are
too specific and voluminous to
cover here. Suffice it to say that
such careful analysis needs to be
paftof ezch challenge. I note that
Iæwis has a good section on court
construction of ambiguity in her
brief as do Zadtck and Duckworth.

Argument The anti-sacking
statute is unconstitutional for
violation of separation of powers.
Bottornly argues the statute
"interferes with the proper sepaø.
tion of powers between the court
and the legislature. He says the legislature's mandate that "the limits of
insurance coverage available under
each oart of the oolicv must be determined as follows . . ." requires a
specific interpretation of the conúactand usurps the power of the
court to interpret contracts thereby

violating Art. VII, $ 1, which vests
all judicial power of the state in the
courts. That section also forbids
persons "charged with the exercise
of power propedy belonging to one
branch" to exercise "any power
properly belonging to either of the
others . . ." G^ty Zzdìck, n the
Gotoski brief doesn't raise constitutional challenges but makes z grcat
statement of the court's role in interpreting contracts.

that carefirl reading of USA,A.'s

clause shows it
does not actually block stacking.
The anti-stacking statute starts \¡/ith
this exception: "Unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides otherwise. . ." If the policy
doesn't block stacking, then it
'þrovides otherwise" and the statute

"limit of liability"

doesn't apply. Similarly, Gene Ja-

Argumenû The anti-stacking
statute is unconstitutional for
violation of equal protection.
Bottonrly argues the statute
violates equal protection of Ärt. II,
$ 4, because the statute treats similarly situated individuals (those who
bought identical coverages) differently. He notes that, under the stat-
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ute, the arnount of UM or UIM coverage the insured actually gets depends on the coverage of the car
rnvolved in the accident and not the
insurance the insured purchased. He
argues as follows: The court must
zpply a compelling state interest test

for constitutionality. One of the
"inalienable dghts" in Ärt. II, $ 3 is
the right to pursue life's necessities,
and insurance benefits âre a necessity, making securing the benefits of
insurance a fundamental right requiring a compelling state interest to
make the statute valid. Even if the
statute does not affectz fundamental interest, it must pass the naonø)
basis test, which it cannot do. Bottomly compares lIeisúer v. Ifines
Motor Co.,20 whidn found violation

of equal protection where one class
of insureds had the rþht to choose a
treating physician while another created by the statute did not. The

court there held reducing costs

of

insurance to be an illegitimate purpose for the statute.

I

submit that another avenue
to argue denial of equal protectron is
to compare that class of insurance
consulners who buy all of the personaì

potable life insurance they

quiring, possessing and protecting
property, and seeking their safety,
health and happiness in all lawful
ways." It argues that securing insurance benef,rts is such a right, which
the statute abroga.tes without compelling intereSt or even a rational

wish and are secure in the benefits,
with that class that similady purchases all tJre UM, UIM, and Med
Pay personal portable auto insurarÌce
they wish. The anti-stacking statute
deprives the latter class of the benefrt of all but one policy coverage.

basis.

Argument: The anti-stacking
statute is unconstitutional for
violation of inalienable right to
protect property and pursue life's
necessities.
Bottomly's brief cites Art. II,
$ 3, for its "inalienable rights" which
ìnclude "the rights of pursuinglife's

Argument: The anti-stacking statute is unconstitutional for violation of substantive due process.
Bottornly bases this argument
Art.
on
II, $ 17's guarantee of due
process of law. In NewuÍúIe v.
State Dept. ofFamily Seruices2T
and Plumb v. FourthJudícia|
District22 the Montana Supreme

basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, ac-

,\s the argument is developed,

"The statute unilaterally prevents a
person from recovering damages to
himself and his family for which he
has paid.It thereby impairs the individual's right to protect these inalienable rights."

Court developed the test that re-
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strictions placed on remedies and
procedures must be reasonable
when balanced against the puqpose

this impairment by not applying the
anti-stacking provisions to then existing policy contracts during their

of the legislature in enacting the

tems.

statute. The means chosen by the
legislature must be reasonably related to the result sought. The statute here is an unreasonable restriction not rationally related to a legrtimate govemment putpose.

I suggest that the argument
that the anti-stacking statute impairs
contracts should be bolstered by
argurng further that auto insurance
is marketed in the form of automati-

Argumenû The anti-stacking
statute is unconstitutional for
violation of the right to full legal
redress.

Bottornly argues that r\rt. II,
$16 provides aright to "frrll legal
redress" whuch the court found to
be fundamental tn Pfost v. State.23
Though it later held the right was

not fundamental in Meech

v.Ifill

IIaven

Wesq fnc.r2+ he argues that
subsequent to Meech,in
Wadsworth v. Statés and MEIC
v. Dept. ofEnuironmental Qualiqrrze ¡t" covft,again indicates that

rights found in the Declaratron of
Rights of the Montana Constitution
are "fundamental,." From this he
argues that the statute violates a fundamental right of legal redress by
depriving the insured of his or'her
right to have the courts interpret the
insurance contract on issues of
stacking.

The Bottomly brief integrates
the constituúonal issues described
above into a single atgument, but
each constitutional violation is well
addressed.

Argument The anti-sacking
statute is unconstitutional
because it impairs the obligation
of contracts.
Loren Toole kt lfancockcites
Art. II, $ 33 for the proposition that
"No. . .law impairing the obligation

cally renewable contracts. All the
consumer does is continue to pay
premiums on the same periodic basis and the contract is renewed without any further application, disclosures or sþatures. (fhis should be
the subject of judicial notice.) This

in Thomas v. hlotthwestern Natíonal
fns, Co.27 in which the court noted

was implicitly recognized

that the consumer assumes the contract is being renewed on the same
terms and doesn't even have a duty
to read the renewa.l policy. Prior to
the effectìve date of the antistacking contract, these ongoing renewable contracts were governed by
Montana case law that allowed the
consumer the benefit of receiving
the limit of UM, UIM, or Med Pay
coverage for each vehicle for which
she had paid apremium. Even after
the 1981 antì-stacking statute
blocked stacking for multiple autos
insured under the same policy, companies like State Farm still freely
chose to place their insured's vehicles under separate renewable policy
contracts and charge separate premiums. They continued to do so even
after the Montana Supreme Court
ruled such practices rendered their
contract benefìts stackable. In this
context of renewable continuing
policy contracts that provided for
muluple premiums and multiple recoveries, the legislature passed a
statute mandating that all such contracts would be interpreted to provide only a single lirrut where the

ofcontracts. . . shall be passed by
the legislature." He a(gues that the
legislature has attempted to create a
"limitation of liability under motor
vehicle liability policy" and has

This is the unconstitutronal impair-

thereby impaired the contracts.
The statute's drafters tried to avoid

ArgumenÍ If the insurer collects
multiple premiums when the
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insured paid multiple premiums.
ment of the contracts.

statute and the policy say there
can be no multiple benefits, then
the insurer should be equiably
estopped from refusing the full
stacked benefits.
Steve Fletcher in one section
of his brief in rhe MítcheII case ât
the Montana Supreme Court, makes
an intriguing altemative argument.
If the language of the statute and
the policy contract prohibiting multiple coverages is valid, then the carrier's act of charging multiple premiums should be an unlawfi.il act.
Steve argues that the carrier who
does so should be estopped from
denying benefits. This line of argt-

ment merits further development
because one could avoid challenging
the statute or policy provisions and
even base the argument on assumed- [o r-the-sake-o fl-argument

validity.

Argument The anti-sacking
stâtute only applies to prevent
stacking "to prevent payments
for the same element of loss.
Pat Sheehy would add this argument, which he points out
"allows the court to intelpret the
anti-stacking statute according to its
tems." He argues that the overarching intent and pulpose of the
statute, "to prevent duplicate payments for the same element of
loss," is stated in subsectron (2).
Sheehy says: "The legislature was
passing the antì-stacking statute to

prevent people from buying multiple coverages and then collecting
twice for medical bills or other
losses from the same claim." He
concludes, the statute should not
apply when the damages of the insured far exceed any single lirrut under any single coverage. Then, it is
important that the insureds get the
stacked coverage they paid for to
cover all their damages.

DEALING WITH TH.E CTIRIS.
TENSON V. MOUNTAIN
V/EST FARM BUREAAMUT.
INS.28 CASE
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The recent (2000) Chtistenson case
involved a newly acquirecl auto for which
the owner purchased a new and separate
policy with Mountain West because her
daughter would be drivrng the car. The
owner's infant granddaughter was severely
injured as a passenger ur the car and was
covered for BI coverage under the auto's
new policy. The real issue was whether the
BI coverage on the owner's prior policy
covering her other cats with Mountain
West would include the auto under the
prior policy's "after acquired vehicle" provision. The court's pfunary holdingwas
that the auto was an "aîter acquired vehicle," so the BI coverage would apply. However, the court then dealt with the question
whether the resulting BI policy coverages
with Mountain West could be "stacked."
The court noted the parallel between the
policy's anti-stacking language in its limitation of liability clause and the language

of

the anti-stacking statute, MCA S 33-23-203
and held that the policies could not be
stacked. The case is touted as a principal
line of defense in the insurer's briefs.
Gary Zadick and Cathy Lewis make
following
arguments regarding Christhe

The important thing to remember about Christenson is that
most of the arguments described in this article were not raised
there. The court simply found that the anti-stackinglanguage of the
policy involved comported with the language of the anti-stacking
case and applied the statute to block stacking of BI coverage. It remains for counsel to develop the best arguments challenging the
statute and the anti-stacking provisions of the policies.

CONCLUSION
The origrnaliry and creativity exhibited in the variety of arguments challenging the antr-stacking staüte and its application is a
testament to the seriousness with which Montana trial lawyers take
their duty to represent their injured clients. It is an honor to review
and summarize the persuasive advocacy of our brothers and sisters
on the stacking issue. They have done us all a favotby sharing their
arguments with MontanaTrialTrcnd¡ for publicatron and by allowrng their briefs to be placed on the MTLA website. Counsel briefing a stacking issue need to thoroughìy develop precise, persuasive,
and credible arguments because his or her case may be the one that
ends up at the Montana Supreme Court and ultimately makes the
law for everJone. Given the importance of the stacking issue,
counsel should notify the MTLA ,\micus Committee if z case tnvolving a stacking issue is appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
No issue could have a broader and greater ftnancid, impact on the
recovery of injured persons than the issue of the legality of the
anti-stacking statute.
As always, I thank Pat Sheehy and Gary Zadtck for their rnvaluable review and comment on this article.

tensofr
The case involved stacking of BI coverages not the personal and portable UM,
UIM, and Med Pay coverages.

Multiple premiums were not paid in
Christenson since no premium was paid
for the new vehicle under the first policy.
The decision doesn't address the requirement of notice of renewal on less favorable terms of S 33-15-1106 or the notice
requirement of $ 33-23-203.
The decision doesn't discuss the requirement that the policy limitatìon be a
"reasonable hmitation under $ 33-23-203 ot
the public policy that prevents an insurer
from charg'ing multiple premiums for a single coverage.

There was no discussion of the unconscionability of the policy.
The policy did not allow stacking as
opposed to some that arguably do.
Kent Duckworth also chaJlenges applicability of Chris tenson atgùng thzt it
doesn't apply where the coverage is personal portable insurance since Chtistenson involved BI coverage that is virtually
never stacked.
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